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Everybody knows that the boat is leaking: 
How Norway thwarts its WTO commitments 
 
1. Introduction  
The World Trade Organization (WTO) has as its primary purpose to open domestic markets 
to international trade for the benefit of all. The system’s overriding purpose is to help trade to 
flow as freely as possible. The Uruguay Round produced the first multilateral agreement that 
addressed trade issues in the agricultural sector in a comprehensive manner. This was a 
significant first step towards greater order, fair competition and a less distorted sector 
internationally.  
Norway is a economically advanced country in north-western Europe, and as with 
many other economically developed countries agriculture is a sector that receives financial 
support through government policies and is protected from international competition. The 
sector’s contribution to GDP is well below one per cent and together with forestry contributes 
less than three per cent of total employment, as measured in standard man-years of labour. 
Production is concentrated in a narrow range of activities, primarily dairy and livestock 
production (WTO 2004; NILF 2007).  
When the WTO was created in 1995 the level of protection in Norwegian agriculture 
was high. Because one the major aims of the Uruguay Round of negotiations was to discipline 
and reduce agricultural support one would expect to see policy effects in countries such as 
Norway. As will be shown in this article the effect of the agreement on government support 
for agriculture has been minimal.   
 Norwegian agricultural policy is aimed at maintaining high levels of agricultural 
activity in all parts of the country, implying that self-sufficiency is a goal along with other 
non-production related objectives. These objectives are to ensure that small-scale farming 
contributes to: (1) rural development, employment and settlement; (2) the supply of 
environmental public goods, linked to the preservation of the rural landscape; (3) long-term 
food security; and (4) consumer welfare linked to production methods that improve the health 
of animals and plants (WTO 2001a; NILF 2007). To meet these objectives, a number of 
agricultural policy instruments are employed, including border protection to support internal 
market prices (such as tariff-based import regulations) and budgetary domestic support. 
Agricultural products not produced domestically are generally subject to low or zero tariffs. 
However, for products that are produced domestically high tariff protection is used as a means 
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of supporting domestic prices and farm income (WTO 2001a). According to the WTO (2004), 
44 percent of Norway’s bound tariffs rates (most-favored nation rates) for agricultural lines 
have prohibitive tariffs exceeding 100 percent, mostly ranging between 100-400 per cent.  
In addition to the protection provided through high tariffs and market access quotas, 
farmers are recipients of domestic support from the national budget. Norway’s high domestic 
support levels are reflected in a high producer support estimate (PSE) value. According to the 
OECD (2012), Norway’s PSE was 58 percent in 2011, meaning that the country ranked first 
among OECD members, followed by Switzerland, Korea and Japan.   
This article serves two purposes. First, we conduct a WTO-consistent assessment of 
Norwegian agricultural programs and policy since 1995. Most important, we highlight cases 
where Norway has found ways to work around its WTO-commitments in order to avoid 
policy reform. The paper is organized in four sections. Section 2 provides a review of key 
elements of domestic agricultural policy. In section 3 Norway’s WTO official agricultural 
support notifications, as required under the terms of the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture (URAA), are examined and compliancy is assessed in terms of the aggregate 
measurement of support (AMS) commitments during 1995-2010. Conclusions are offered in 
Section 4. 
 
 
2. Domestic Agricultural Policy 
To meet its agricultural policy objectives, Norway’s domestic support programs have been 
accompanied by a restrictive trade policy. Direct support is provided through various price 
and income support instruments, production subsidies and investment measures. Direct 
payments are differentiated to account for geographical differences and farm size (NILF, 
2007). Regulatory and other policy measures that aim to stabilize and support domestic 
market prices feature prominently. Trade instruments (i.e., tariffs, tariff-rate quotas and export 
subsidies) provide the backbone for domestic price support.  
 Target prices are an important element in market regulation.  These are determined 
annually for the main agricultural products (i.e., dairy, meat products and eggs) through 
negotiations between the Norwegian government and the two farmers’ unions. Farmer-owned 
cooperatives are given the responsibility to regulate sales in domestic agricultural markets to 
ensure that farm gate prices stay close to the target prices (NILF, 2007).  
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 There are several institutional and regulatory arrangements that contribute to ensuring 
that the market price remains close to the target price. First, market access restrictions provide 
the necessary protection to enable target prices to be set above border prices. Prohibitive 
MFN tariff rates mean that imports are limited to relatively small tariff-rate quotas (with in-
quota tariff rates that typically are above 100 percent).  Second, the cooperatives, being 
responsible for regulating the markets, are exempt from anti-trust laws relating to pricing 
practices and market concentration, and, consequently, have relatively high market shares.1 
Third, any farmer who is not a member of a cooperative is legally obliged to contribute to the 
financing of the marketing functions performed by the cooperative, e.g., storage or export. 
Finally, the Norwegian Agricultural Authority (NAA) is charged with temporarily reducing 
applied tariffs on imports whenever the market price exceeds the target price by more than the 
specified upper limit for two consecutive weeks.2 There have been times when the applied 
tariff has been lowered to keep the market price below the upper limit (NILF, 2007). In 
addition to subsidized exports of cheese, which take place on a regular basis, export subsidies 
have been employed to prevent domestic price from falling too far below the target price for 
other products (primarily other dairy products and meat).  
 To illustrate the typical price pattern in the domestic market, data for poultry for 1995-
2008 are presented in Figure 1. The dotted line represents the domestic market price, which 
has moved in lock step with the annually negotiated target price, depicted by the solid line. At 
the bottom of the chart are the corresponding border price and the fixed 1986-88 reference 
price notified in Norway’s Uruguay round domestic support commitments.3  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 For some products, e.g., dairy, the market share of the cooperative exceeds 90 percent. However, in other 
commodity categories, particularly fruit and vegetables, market shares are below 50 percent. 
2 The NAA is an agency of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food, which is responsible for ensuring that all 
agricultural schemes and regulations are administered uniformly across the country.  
3 The border price of poultry was chosen to be comparable with the domestic price. It is taken from the OECD 
PSE database, table 4.6, and is defined as a “border reference price (f.o.b.)”, referred to as line VII.1 in the table. 
This price includes processing costs.  
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 Sources: NAA (2009) and OECD (2007) 
Figure 1. The market for poultry. Prices 1995-2008  
 
Figure 1 shows that the domestic price is far higher than the border price (by 250-300 
percent), which is made possible by a prohibitive tariff (425 percent). Furthermore, it is 
apparent that there is a very high correlation between the target price and the market price. 
Although the graph only illustrates the price pattern for poultry, the situation is similar in 
most other regulated markets in that there is a general tendency for a high degree of 
correlation between the market price and the target price. The correlation is perfect for grains. 
It is very high for the various meat products and milk, although it is weaker for fruits and 
vegetables due to the somewhat greater price variability associated with these products.   
 
 
3. Domestic support: WTO commitments, compliancy and composition of  
    support 
Despite ushering in trade rules and agreements that were intended to introduce discipline on 
international agricultural markets, the WTO provided net agricultural importing countries 
such as Norway considerable flexibility in managing their agricultural policy. But 
commitments have been introduced.  An accomplishment of the Uruguay round was that a 
countries’ domestic support should be notified. The notifications should follow a scheme 
where support should be grouped under one of the following headings: Aggregate measure of 
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support (AMS) or amber box support as it is often referred to, green box or blue box support. 
Under AMS any agricultural programs that encourage production through subsidization of the 
cost of inputs into production or support of market prices for agricultural outputs are reported. 
Support schemes with no or minimal trade-distorting effect can, according to Annex 2 of the 
URAA, be placed in the green box. This type of support must be provided through a publicly-
funded government program not involving transfers from consumers, and cannot have the 
effect of providing price support to producers. Programs listed under the blue box relates to 
payments connected to production with quotas or production ceilings 
 In the next sections Norway’s WTO commitments from 1995 are reported.4 These 
notifications are made in Norwegian krone (NOK). For readers who are unfamiliar with the 
value of the Norwegian currency, the approximate exchange rate against the USD in August 
2012 was NOK 5.83, which is in the lower end of the rates over the last 25 years. A more 
representative value of the USD in terms of NOK would be to take the average value over the 
last 25 years, which is approximately NOK 7.50.  
 
3.1. Norway’s notifications 
In Figure 2 the value of Norwegian current total AMS and the value of the three different 
types of domestic support are presented for the years 1995 to 2010, which is the last year 
Norway has notified support for.  
                                                 
4 Notification documents submitted by Norway to the WTO on domestic support can be accessed through the 
WTO's documents on-line database. These documents have a document symbol, G/AG/N/NOR/. 
   
SNF Working Paper No. 32/12 
6 
 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
Year
B
il
li
o
n
 N
O
K
Green box
Blue box
AMS
 
Source: WTO notification documents (G/AG/N/NOR/ various years); 
Figure 2:  Norway’s Domestic Agricultural Support Notification 1995-2010 
 
We see that the total notified support has stayed more or less constant through the period. The 
same is true for the AMS support, the lowest section of the bar (in yellow) in Figure 2. That 
means that the sum of blue and green box has also been more or less constant. The most 
distinguished feature of the figure is seen in the share between blue and green support. In 
2005 the blue box notification dropped significantly, while the green box notification 
increased accordingly.  
 
3.2. WTO commitments and compliancy in domestic support 
Amber box support 
During the Uruguay Round negotiations of the GATT, Norway established a base rate of its 
total value of AMS during 1986-88 at NOK14.3 billion. Norway’s commitment required a 20 
percent reduction in AMS from the base rate over the implementation period, 1995-2000. 
From 2000, the final bound total value of AMS has been NOK11.4 billion. The bound rate of 
total AMS is the kinked line (in red) drawn in Figure 3.  
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Source: WTO notification documents (G/AG/N/NOR/ various years);  
Figure 3: Current total AMS relative to AMS bindings. Norway, 1995-2010 
 
The bound rate decreases between 1995-2000 in accordance with the annual reduction 
commitments and then levels off at the new current total AMS ceiling after 2000.5 
The lower line (in blue) in Figure 3 is notified AMS. We see that the gap between the bound 
rate and the actual annual value narrowed, particularly from 2000 to 2007. In 2008 the AMS-
notification surpassed the commitment. The last two years the AMS notification has 
decreased in particular the last year which is reported, 2010. The explanation an discussion 
around this is postponed to the next section 3.3. 
 
Looking at the details in Norway’s AMS notification, more than 90 % is in the form of  
market price support6, which is the difference between an administered price (that is, a target 
price that is agreed to by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food and producer groups, or fixed 
farm-gate prices in the case of grains) and an external reference price (border price), 
                                                 
5 AMS is calculated in nominal terms. Consequently, there will be a decrease in the AMS commitment level in 
real terms if a general price increase is considered. 
6 In addition to price support, there is product-specific support that comes in the form of non-exempt direct 
payments. These are relatively small deficiency payments provided to milk, bovine, and sheep production. Other 
product-specific support includes transport subsidies to meats and eggs, and a farm feed adjustment (which is 
considered an associated fee). The feed adjustment value is subtracted to reduce the domestic support that is 
provided to livestock and milk producers for having to buy concentrated feed at a price above the world market 
price.  Under the AMS support is also reported payments made under product-specific equivalent measurements. 
These are subsidies related to marketing, storage and transport of fruit, berries and vegetables. We also find Non-
product-specific AMS and associated fees and levies include insemination subsidies and taxes on fertilizers and 
pesticides, respectively. 
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multiplied by the eligible production. Price support is essentially support that consumers pay 
for in the form of higher food prices rather than involving a budgetary outlay. The target 
prices (primarily on livestock meat products, eggs, milk and potatoes) are supported through 
trade-regulating market access restrictions and export management. This ensures that the 
internal domestic market prices are close to the targeted prices. 
 
Green box support 
There are no ceilings or reduction commitments in the value of support under the green box 
type of agricultural programs. Table 1 lists the most important programs under the green box 
category.  
  
Table 1. Principal programs notified and calculated under green box, 1995-2010 
 
PROGRAMS 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Research 
and similar 
 
971 
 
1023 
 
707 
 
828 
 
880 
 
909 
 
899 
 
803 
 
875 
 
990 
 
557 
 
627 
 
829 
 
818 
 
876 
 
903 
Grain price 
support 
 
694 
 
506 
 
747 
 
725 
 
663 
 
716 
 
718 
 
540 
 
529 
 
671 
 
7 
 
6 
 
7 
 
6 
 
7 
 
6 
Investment 
aid 
 
763 
 
741 
 
654 
 
713 
 
849 
 
771 
 
858 
 
853 
 
632 
 
664 
 
599 
 
613 
 
632 
 
444 
 
625 
 
549 
Vacation 
scheme 
 
1413 
 
1426 
 
1281 
 
1326 
 
1394 
 
1480 
 
1400 
 
1539 
 
1161 
 
1191 
 
1183 
 
1202 
 
1174 
 
1232 
 
1261 
 
1276 
Landscape 
scheme 
 
161 
 
180 
 
180 
 
188 
 
217 
 
264 
 
264 
 
318 
 
292 
 
249 
 
3395 
 
3613 
 
3943 
 
4157 
 
4186 
 
4356 
Others 114 215 106 109 272 886 177 284 392 221 124 126 133 206 137 147 
Total 4116 4091 3675 3889 4275 5026 4316 4337 3881 3986 5865 6187 6718 6863 7092 7237 
Source: WTO notification documents (G/AG/N/NOR/ various years);  
 
During the years up to 2004, the largest single-entry line item listed under green box support 
was the “Vacation and replacement scheme”. This program gives refunds for expenses during 
holidays and alleviates financial difficulties due to illness and is a part of the welfare scheme 
to farmers. This kind of support is not mentioned in the Annex 2 of the URAA. The support is 
quite substantial, constituting about 20 % of the total green box support notified. Since this 
scheme in reality can have an equivalent effect as a subsidy to farm labor, it can be argued 
that the scheme has, in fact, stimulated production. In addition, because the payment that is 
made under this scheme is either based on the number of animals or the acreage in 
production, this also appears inconsistent with the production-neutral requirement that must 
be met under green box support. Member countries could challenge Norway’s placement of 
this program under the green box, requiring the notification of such support under AMS 
instead. 
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  Another questionable measure is the grain price support program notified under the 
Annex 2 heading of public stockholding for food security purposes. During 1995-2004, the 
payment was given to processing industries that use Norwegian grain, and constituted a price-
reducing subsidy because the payment was provided on a per kilogram basis. A second item 
notified under the public stockholding heading was expenses incurred by the government in 
regulating the grain price. Neither of these items complies with the Annex 2 criteria for public 
stockholding for food security purposes.7 In the latest notifications by the Norwegian 
government (2005-2010), the grain price support has been removed from the green box.  
 The “Research, advisory and training support programs” are services provided by the 
government, which are categorized as “General services” by the WTO. In accordance with 
Annex 2 of the URAA, “General services” are targeted to agriculture or the rural community, 
but should not involve direct payments to producers or processors. 
 The “Investment aid” includes the expenditures from the Agricultural Development 
Fund. The investment aid is given under the WTO rubric of “Structural adjustment assistance 
provided through investment aids”, which in Norway’s stated case is given as an aid for 
structural adjustment and rural development services. Increasingly these funds have been 
redirected towards stimulating new business activities, in addition to “traditional farming”, in 
rural areas. However, increasingly less of this support is being given as investment support for 
traditional agricultural production activities (NILF 2007). This line item accounts for about 8 
percent of the total notified green box support. The most important WTO conditions for this 
kind of support are that the payment shall not give a producer the incentive to produce a 
certain product, and that the payment shall only compensate and assist the financial or 
physical restructuring of a producer’s operations from the structural disadvantages, to be 
given only for the period necessary for the realization of the investment (GATT 1994).  
Since 2005 environmental payments have become the largest green box category of 
support for Norway. These consist of payments under the acreage and cultural landscape 
scheme, but also include smaller programs such as a subsidy for organic production. Earlier, 
payments under the acreage and cultural landscape scheme were notified in the blue box, but 
in 2005 they were included in the existing National Environmental Program. An 
environmental plan must be followed by participants and acreage must be managed in an 
                                                 
7 “Expenditures (or revenue foregone) in relation to the accumulation and holding of stocks of products which 
form an integral part of a food security programme identified in national legislation. This may include 
government aid to private storage of products as part of such a programme. Food purchases by the government 
shall be made at current market prices and sales from food security stocks shall be made at no less than the 
current domestic market price for the product and quality in question” (GATT 1994, p. 58).  
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environment-friendly manner. A farmer receives a specified payment per hectare as a reward 
for compliance. In addition, payments are provided on an activity-specific basis to help cover 
the costs of implementing certain types of production techniques. The NAA claims that the 
acreage and cultural landscape scheme complies with green box criteria. However, this is 
questionable. First, in order for farmers to receive support, production (active farming) is 
necessary. Second, to be classified as an environmental payment, according to the Agreement, 
the amount should be limited to the loss of income or additional costs involved with 
compliance with an environmental program. The payments in this case do not seem to be 
related to additional costs or income foregone. 
 
Blue box support 
Support schemes classified under the blue box fall under three types: (1) payments based on 
fixed area and yields; (2) payments made on 85 percent or less of the base level of production; 
and (3) livestock payments made on a fixed number of head. As with the value of green box 
support programs, there was no WTO commitment requiring a ceiling on the value of blue 
box support. Table 2 lists all the programs under the blue box as notified from 1995-2010.  
 
Table 2.  Principal programs notified under blue box, 1995-2010 
  
 
PROGRAMS 
 
1995 
 
1996 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
Landscape 
schem 
 
2751 
 
3209 
 
3305 
 
3752 
 
3176 
 
3123 
 
2969 
 
3023 
 
2976 
 
3003 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
Structural 
support 
 
1539 
 
1483 
 
143 
 
1425 
 
1394 
 
1330 
 
1176 
 
1306 
 
1214 
 
1175 
 
1067 
 
1008 
 
951 
 
1025 
 
972 
 
1091 
Deficiency 
milk 
 
450 
 
432 
 
434 
 
433 
 
450 
 
428 
 
382 
 
414 
 
416 
 
421 
 
409 
 
380 
 
431 
 
452 
 
464 
 
523 
Deficiency 
meat 
 
506 
 
512 
 
516 
 
523 
 
512 
 
473 
 
539 
 
537 
 
518 
 
540 
 
564 
 
539 
 
471 
 
625 
 
582 
 
600 
Headage 
support 
 
1871 
 
1611 
 
1678 
 
1748 
 
2142 
 
2317 
 
2265 
 
2251 
 
2236 
 
2295 
 
1874 
 
1866 
 
1872 
 
1879 
 
2120 
 
2181 
Total 7117 7246 7375 7880 7674 7669 7330 7531 7360 7434 3915 3794 3725 3982 4138 4395 
Source: WTO notification documents (G/AG/N/NOR/ various years); NILF; SN 
 
The “Structural income support” (to dairy farmers) and the “Regional deficiency payments” 
for milk and meat production are categorized as payments on 85 percent or less of base level 
production.8 The aim of the regional deficiency payments is to even out the profitability or 
income between farmers who are located in more remote areas with those farmers who are 
located closer to urban markets.  
                                                 
8 The way we have calculated blue box support for 2005-07 differs slightly from what is notified to the WTO 
during 1995-2004. One reason is that until 2002, the payments given to the acreage and cultural landscape 
scheme were only reported as aggregated payments. Some elements of this payment are parts of the green 
support.  
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 The “Headage support”, a per unit livestock payment, is the largest blue box income-
support payment. This support is supposed to even out the differences in profitability among 
different lines of production and among farms of different size.  
In 2007, another change was introduced by the Norwegian Agricultural Authority 
whereby the support to grazing livestock, which earlier was considered part of “headage 
support” under the blue box, was included in the National Environmental Programme and was 
claimed to be green box (MAF 2006).  Because the support was labeled as a component of an 
environmental program, it was re-classified even though the nature of the payment had not 
changed. Hence, NOK 3 billion of the NOK 7.5 billion blue box support in 2004 has been 
shifted into the green box. 
 
3.3. Playing the “Japanese card” 
Playing the “Japanese card” is our phrase for what happens if a country lowers the AMS 
support by abolishing the administered price on a specific product. By doing so the product in 
question can be excluded from the market price support computation (see Orden et al. (2011), 
and consequently, the AMS-support will be reduced automatically. Japan was the first country 
to follow this strategy.  
In 1997, Japan reduced its notified AMS substantially by changing its rice policy. 
Administered prices for rice were eliminated, although the government continued to acquire 
rice for food security stocks (Godo and Takahashi 2008). There was little real change in the 
Japanese rice market since domestic producers were protected by a tariff rate quota with a 
prohibitive over-quota tariff. Many other WTO countries have since lowered their AMS 
support by abolishing or redefining the purpose of administered prices thereby removing 
market price support from the AMS calculation.9 
The Norwegian Ministry of Agriculture and Food has on several occasions announced 
that it will abolish certain domestic administered prices, as a means of reducing its current 
total AMS. From 1 January 2007, an equivalent reference price for poultry meat replaced the 
former administered price. In a proposition to the parliament (MAF 2005), it was argued that 
this would remove market price support for poultry meat from the AMS calculation and 
reduce total AMS support by NOK 800 million. In May 2008, in negotiations between the 
farmers’ unions and the Ministry of Agriculture and Food, it was agreed to increase prices on 
most agricultural products. At the same time administered prices for pigs and sheep was 
                                                 
9 According to Brink (2008), other countries, notably Australia, EU, Mexico, South Africa, Switzerland and the 
USA have also adopted this strategy. 
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replaced by reference prices, thereby removing these products from the AMS support 
calculation. This action was taken in order to avoid a violation of the AMS ceiling. 
Nevertheless the AMS ceiling was violated in 2008, as was shown in Figure 3. Further action 
therefore had to be taken. In 2009 the market price support for beef was removed from the 
AMS calculation. Since this is an important product, it really helped, as Figure 3 clearly 
reflects.   
 
3.4. Box shifting 
According to the current WTO requirement on domestic support, a country is not restricted as 
to the size of blue box support. But future WTO rounds are likely to introduce ceilings on the 
blue box support. The negotiation in the current Doha round can serve as an example. Here it 
is proposed a limit on blue box support, while green box support is allowed to continue 
unrestricted. Countries may therefore have an incentive to redefine its policy measures so that 
these can be notified as green box. Norway has undertaken considerable preparation to justify 
such box shifting. The “acreage and cultural landscape scheme” is an example. In 2005 this 
scheme was included as an important element in the National Environmental Programme 
(MLSI 2004, MLSI 2005 and MAF 2005). For a farmer to be eligible for support an 
environmental plan must be followed and land must be managed in an environmentally 
friendly manner. The farmer receives a per hectare payment for compliance. There is 
additional support to help cover the cost of implementing certain types of production 
techniques, provided on an activity-specific basis. The national regulatory body, the 
Norwegian Agricultural Authority, has claimed that this support complies with green box 
criteria.10  Clearly this can be seen as an attempt from the Norwegian policymakers to meet a 
specified Doha cap under the blue box. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
The URAA reduction requirements have not affected Norwegian agricultural policy or 
programs. Norway has in fact managed to expand agricultural output relative to the 1986-88 
base period, and as we have pointed out AMS and total support have remained stable during 
1995-2010.  
                                                 
10 This can be questioned since green box criteria require that  a payment can only compensate for additional 
costs or income foregone through complying with an environmental program.  
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 Accept from one occasion, Norway has complied with its URAA commitments. 
Although Norway’s notifications comply with the URAA commitments, we argue that several 
of the entities put into green box are questionable. For example, the “Vacation and 
replacement scheme” and the “Grain price support programme” seem to be amber support 
masked as green support. Also, it is an open question whether the “Acreage and cultural 
landscape sceme” complies with the URAA that states that the payment can only compensate 
for the loss of income involved with complying with an environmental program. As argued in 
Blandford et al. (2010), the motivation for this box shifting is that Norway, as a consequence 
of an agreement in the Doha round may be required to reduce the blue box support. Blue box 
shifting is a way of avoiding such demands. 
 In 2008 Norway surpassed the AMS-ceiling, and on several occasions Norway has 
been on the very edge of the ceiling. In these cases, Norway’s response has been to abolish 
administered prices on certain products, thereby excluding the corresponding market price 
support from the AMS calculation. In this way, Norway has been able to keep up production 
and forestall agricultural restructuring. Even if this is legal, it is clearly against the intensions 
of the WTO principles.  
As is pointed out by Blandford et al. (2010), the current modalities under the Doha 
Round negotiations could result in more binding reduction commitments on Norwegian 
agriculture. An elimination of export subsidies will mainly affect milk and cheese, but also 
beef and pork. The combination of increased market access and reduced domestic support 
should have more serious consequences on domestic price and production levels. 
Nevertheless, repackaging of current domestic support (masking amber box subsidy as green 
box) or eliminating “redundant” policy (that is, by removing administrative prices) could 
forestall much agricultural restructuring.  
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We conduct a WTO-consistent assessment of Norwegian agricultural programs and 
policy since 1995. Most important, we highlight cases where Norway has found 
ways to work around its WTO-commitments in order to avoid policy reform. On 
several occasions Norway has been on the edge of breaking the amber box com-
mitment. In these cases, Norway’s response has been to abolish target prices on 
certain products, thereby excluding the corresponding market price support from 
the amber box calculation. In this way, Norway has been able to keep up production 
and forestall agricultural restructuring. Even if this is legal, it is clearly against the 
intensions of the WTO principles. We also argue that several of the entities put into 
green box are questionable. For example, the “Vacation and replacement scheme” 
seem to be amber support masked as green support.
